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     The following discussion will first deal with different comparative 
approaches to the modern phase of Japanese history, and then move on to con-
sider the underlying conceptions and criteria of modernity; it will finish with 
some tentative directions for further comparative analysis. It should be noted that 
the three successive strategies of comparison, summarized below, are neither 
mutually exclusive nor limited to the historical conjunctures which made them 
seem particularly relevant. Rather, they relate to different levels of analysis and 
layers of historical significance, highlighted by changing circumstances; all of 
them have to some degree been applied throughout the long-standing debate on 
modern Japan, and the task of theoretical reflection is to synthesize their respec-
tive insights and rationales, not to choose between them. Similarly, the images 
of modernity that have served to anchor comparative perspectives can to some 
extent be seen as alternative models, but not as incompatible paradigms. As I 
will try to show, it makes more sense to speak of steps towards contextualiza-
tion. An initially dominant but fundamentally inadequate conception of moderni-
ty must be overcome without losing sight of its relative truth-content. And the 
construction of a more complex theoretical framework is closely linked to better 
understanding of the specific case in question: as the idea of multiple modernities 
acquires clearer contours and firmer theoretical foundations, the originality of the 
Japanese experience becomes more visible and significant.
I 
     The first of the three comparative perspectives which I want to discuss has 
to do with Japan as an example of non-Western responses to Western expansion 
and domination. In that context, the Meiji transformation - together with its 
sequel - stands out as a particularly effective counter-project, and its exemplary 
results were the main focus of references to Japan during the early phase of post-
war modernization theory. The most instructive comparative analyses under-
taken on this basis stressed the affinities as well as the contrasts between Japan 
and states with a much longer record of direct contact with Western powers. 
Both Russian and Turkish trajectories of modernization were extensively com-
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pared to the Japanese one and used to illustrate general patterns as well as possi-
ble variations.1 The same line of argument could even be extended to Germany, 
inasmuch as that country's relationship to more advanced western and northwest-
ern neighbours prefigured later patterns of unequal development on a global 
scale. But modernizing latecomers within or on the margins of the Western 
world are not the only relevant cases. The Japanese achievement, although unde-
niably outstanding in the Asian and African world, could be compared to the 
much less impressive efforts of a few other countries which also escaped col-
onization. Earlier accounts of Thailand and its exceptional record in the South-
east Asian context tended to overdraw parallels with Japan; as more recent critical 
reappraisals have shown, Thailand was in fact too dependent on Western powers 
to be regarded as a case of autonomous development.2 In a more idiosyncratic 
vein, Anthony Giddens has compared Japanese and Ethiopian responses to the 
Western challenge.3 Finally, the analysis of the Japanese modernizing process can 
throw some light on developments in major Asian countries whose road to mod-
ernity was more affected by foreign domination. Their modernizing strategies 
were - to a more or less significant and lasting extent - influenced by the 
Japanee precedent and thus conducive to indirect Westernization through emula-
tion of the state that had gained unique prestige by pioneering an innovative 
method of matching Western power. 
     As for the specific themes and issues that may be tackled from this compa-
rative angle, the contrasts and parallels drawn between Japan, Russia and Turkey 
are probably most revealing. In all three cases, the need to import and/or imitate 
Western ways of rationalizing the pursuit of power appears as a catalyst of more 
far-reaching changes; the first steps of strategic modernization lead to unintended 
consequences and unexpected pressures for more radical moves, but the ability to 
cope with this expanding horizon of change varies significantly from case to case. 
In general terms, however, the state can be seen as the central actor of both the 
initial modernizing turn and the subsequent transformative phase. The fun-
damental similarity of state-centred modernizing processes does not exclude ma-
jor divergences. In that regard, some distinctive aspects of the Japanese experi-
ence can serve to exemplify broader issues. The sustained dynamism and auton-
omy of the Japanese modernizing process since 1868 are all the more remarkable 
in view of the fact that it had been preceded by a long phase of strategic with-
1 Cf. especially C. Black et al. (eds), The Modernization ofJapan and Russia, New York, 1976. 
  R. E. Ward and D. Rustow (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Princeton, 1964. 
2 Cf. B. Anderson, "Studies of the Thai state: The state of Thai studies", in E. B. Ayal (ed.), The Study 
  of Thailand, Ohio University, 1978, pp.193-247. 
3 A. Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, Cambridge, 1985, pp.473-4. 
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drawal and minimized contact with the Western world, which in turn had fol-
lowed a brief but by no means insignificant first encounter. By contrast, the 
Russian and Turkish trajectories were characterized by more continuity of contact 
with the West but less continuity of the collective identity and the imaginary 
frame of reference that lent cultural meaning to the strategies of response. Furth-
ermore, the Japanese pattern of ideological orientation - a particularly radical 
but adaptable version of nationalism, going far beyond the Western model which 
antedated it - can be contrasted with the Turkish retreat from imperial and reli-
gious universalism towards a more unconditionally Westernizing nationalism, as 
well as with the Russian invention of a universal counter-paradigm of modernity 
to challenge the West in global terms. Finally, the specific characteristics of 
Japanese modernity cannot be analyzed without posing the question of their tra-
ditional preconditions, more visibly important - and more explicitly invoked -
in Japan than in the West. The Japanese case thus becomes a starting-point for 
relativizing the contrast between tradition and modernity, and for rethinking a 
distinction grounded in Western experiences (and reinforced by one-sided read-
ings of the latter). This line of argument would seem to represent the most 
radical use that can be made of our first comparative perspective. 
      The second one has so far been less in evidence among modernization 
theorists. It is mainly advocated by comparative historians, and their principal 
reasons relate to developments during the Meiji epoch, seen as comparable to 
changes unfolding in advanced Western societies at the same time.' In this view, 
the historical conjuncture of the 1850s and 1860s may have put Japan in a posi-
tion akin to other countries threatened by Western expansion, but the excep-
tionally rapid reorientation of Japanese global strategy made the sequel more 
similar to innovations within the Western core. The trends and policies in ques-
tion have to do with the socio-cultural ramifications of state-building, and the 
Japanese pattern can be compared to other ascendant powers; in this context, 
Germany is seen as a core state aspiring to hegemony, rather than an internal 
periphery of the West, but parallels can also be drawn with Britain, France and 
the United States. What these key players of the global state system have in 
common is a multi-faceted agenda of national integration, mobilization and accu-
mulation. If there were some distinctively Japanese ways of pursuing these goals, 
they can be explained in terms of specific constraints as well as inventive 
approaches to the problems of advanced modernity. From the former point of 
view, it seems particularly significant that Japan had to carry out an industrial re-
volution in conjunction with the restructuring of state and society (this con-
4 For a succinct introductory discussion of these issues, cf. Akira Iriye, "Japan's drive to great power sta-
   tus", in The Cambridge History ofJapan, vol.5: The Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, 1985, pp.473-4. 
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stellation is reminiscent of rapidly advancing latecomers within the Western re-
gion but the linkage of capitalist acccumulation and bureaucratic state-building 
was probably more methodical and effective than anywhere else). And the simul-
taneous turn to imperial expansion, inseparable from the broader economic and 
political transformation, took place in a more exceptional context: contrary to the 
global reach of Western colonial empires, Japanese colonialism had to operate 
within a region of which it had previously been a marginal part. As for the other 
differentiating factor (innovations based on specific historical resources and ex-
periences), the most obvious case in point is the emergence of a particularly in-
clusive and pervasive version of nationalism, backed up by reconstructed tradi-
tions and translatable into strategies of state control.5 
      Another very important offshoot of this second comparative perspective 
should be noted. If the Meiji transformation entailed changes of essentially the 
same kind as those undergone by hegemonic Western states, the question of en-
dogenous sources and preconditions must be posed. Growing interest in the 
Tokugawa antecedents of Meiji Japan has led to better understanding of the early 
modern epoch as a distinctive historical phase. The mid-nineteenth-century re-
turn of Western powers to the region thus seems to have precipitated a transition 
whose outcome reflected more internal trends: from a country developing inde-
pendently of the West and inventing original solutions to some of the same prob-
lems, Japan was transformed into an exceptionally receptive but also uniquely 
autonomous borrower of Western techniques and institutions. Historical analyses 
of the early modern background have opened up a particularly interesting field of 
comparative studies. Some of the most interesting work in this area has been 
done on early modern Japan and France, but A. Macfarlane has recently - in a 
somewhat overdone fashion - tried to construct long-term parallels between 
English and Japanese history.6 In any case, the question of similarities and difer-
ences between early modern Japanese and Western lines of development is open 
to further research. And it is obviously one of the main starting-points for a 
more general debate on trends in the whole Eurasian region.7 The theoretical 
issue, more or less fully articulated, is of prime importance: it is being suggested 
that we can speak of modern or proto-modern patterns, as well as of processes 
with modernizing implications and outcomes, in regions beyond the reach of sig-
nificant Western impact and epochs prior to the decisive breakthrough of Western
5 Cf. particularly M. Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Japanese Politics, 2ed., London, 1963. 
6 Cf. particularly J. L. McLain et al. (eds.), Edo and Paris: Urban Life and the State in the Early Modern 
  Era, Ithaca, 1994; and A. Macfarlane, "'Japan' in an English mirror", Modern Asian Studies 31:4 
  (1997), pp.763-806. 
7 Cf. the contributions in Modern Asian Studies 31:3 (1997), edited and introduced by V. Lieberman.
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expansion. This claim has far-reaching consequences for the whole problematic 
of Westernization and modernization, but the contributions of comparative his-
tory have yet to be fully integrated into the mainstream of theoretical debates. 
     The third approach I want to discuss is less developed than the other two; 
but as I will try to show, it can be linked to very fruitful theoretical ideas. With 
the rise of new developmental centres in East Asia (first Korea and Taiwan, then 
parts of mainland China), the modern Japanese achievement - although unequal-
led - came to be seen as less unique and more comparable with other projects 
drawing on a shared regional background. This trend was reinforced by growing 
awareness of the specific patterns of East Asian history and the regional responses 
to Western hegemony. To interpret the Japanese experience in this context is to 
pose two interrelated questions: how significant is the common East Asian herit-
age for the overall regional configuration of modernity, and how to account for 
the features which set the Japanese trajectory apart from the rest of the region? 
These developments are too recent for alternative positions to have taken clear 
shape, but we can at least distinguish two very different lines of argument. On 
the one hand, the manifest resurgence of the whole region has led many obser-
vers to stress the most familiar and official part of its heritage. The notion of a 
"Confucian region" has thus gained some currency; a representative work written 
before the demise of Communism made the claim that Confucian ideology was 
to East Asia what liberalism was to the West and socialism to the Soviet bloc.8 
Although things seem decidedly less clear-cut in the post-Communist world, the 
idea of a specific Confucian connection between tradition and modernity in East 
Asia has not disappeared, and there is no reason to doubt that Confucian patterns 
of thought and models of behaviour were in many ways relevant to the recent 
and contemporary history of the region; here I only want to indicate the main 
difficulties with a strong version of the thesis. First, the case for a Confucian 
economic ethic involved in late twentieth-century capitalist development cannot 
be made without a complementary account of traditional inaction. If there is a 
developmentalist side to the Confucian ethic, it must be one that could be effec-
tively neutralized for a long time by contextual factors (or countervailing tenden-
cies internal to the same tradition). Second, the East Asian tradition was not sim-
ply or unequivocally Confucian; rather, the Confucian strand (always marked by 
internal diversity) was a crucial but never exclusive component of a more com-
plex tradition, adapting to other currents and redefining itself in the process, but 
striving with notable success to impose an orthodox self-image which obscured 
the underlying plurality. Third, historical research has cast doubt on earlier 
8 G. Rozman et al. (eds.), The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and its Modern Adaptation, Prin-
   ceton, 1991. 
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assumptions about the homogeneity of the region, especially on the construct of 
a uniformly Neo-Confucian early modern phase, and drawn attention to the 
varying destinies of Confucian doctrines in China, Korea and Japan. In particu-
lar, it seems that the misconception of Tokugawa Japan as dominated by Neo-
Confucian orthodoxy and integrated into a Neo-Confucian regional culture has 
been effectively demolished. Finally, claims on behalf of the Confucian legacy 
must also come to grips with the difficult task of establishing and explaining its 
survival throughout modern upheavals in both continental and insular parts of 
the region. The defeat of the Taiping rebellion in China is arguably as important 
for the subsequent history of East Asia as the success of the Meiji Restoration in 
Japan.9 And the revolutionary phase - or intermezzo - of twentieth-century 
Chinese history can hardly be treated as a temporary deviation from Confucian 
patterns. The comparative study of revolutionary crises and ruptures in the re-
gion is still in an early stage. 
     In view of the difficulties faced by advocates of historical or civilizational 
continuity, some authors seem inclined to take the opposite tack and stress the 
transformative dynamism that has been so much more characteristic of the East 
Asian world than of other regions reacting to Western hegemony. From this 
point of view, modern Japan - from 1868 onwards - can be seen as a pioneer-
ing innovator which brought irreversible change to other parts of the region. 10 
Japanese rule in Korea destroyed the traditional order and paved the way (unin-
tentionally and unevenly) for more independent development. Similarly, Japanese 
colonization of an outlying Chinese province (Taiwan) and the creation of a client 
state in a much more peripheral region (Manchuria) had far-reaching consequ-
ences for the course of Chinese history. Most importantly, there are good 
reasons to doubt that a Communist revolution would have taken place in China, 
had it not been for the shattering impact of Japanese imperialism on the half-con-
solidated nationalist regime. If we add to these considerations the point that a 
Japanese institutional invention - the capitalist developmental state - has (in 
different ways at different historical junctures) played the role of precedent and 
model on a regional scale, there seems to be a strong case for interpreting mod-
ern East Asian histoty in terms of a Japanese "big bang" and multiple but compa-
rable repercussions throughout neighbouring countries. 
     But this does not dispose of the questions raised (however one-sidedly) by 
defenders of the Confucian thesis. Japan's road to modernity, including the radical 
9 This point is made by M. Geyer and Ch. Bright in "Global violence and nationalizing wars in Eurasia 
    and America: The geopolitics of war in the mid-nineteenth century", Comparative Studies in Society 
   and History 38:4 (1996), pp. 619-57. 
10 Cf. B. Cumings, "The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy", Interna-
    tional Organization 38:1 (1984), pp.1-40. 
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turn taken in the second half of the nineteenth century, has a prehistory which 
cannot be understood. without reference to the regional context and Japanese 
ways of relating to it. Analogously, the role of long-term trends and durable 
legacies in the responses to the Japanese bid for empire calls for closer examina-
tion. In brief, the problem of the relationship between civilizational background 
and contemporary change remains on the agenda.
                      II 
     Let us now turn to the second problematic mentioned at the beginning: 
the underlying interpretations of modernity that inform and orient comparative 
study. It seems easy to identify the interpretive premises of the first approach. If 
the modernizing processes and strategies exemplified by the Japanese case are, 
first and foremost, marked by more or less effective learning from Western pre-
cedents (mainly in the domains of wealth and power), and more or less far-
reaching effects of the applied lessons, the general idea of modernization can be 
defined in cognitivist and technological terms: it refers to the sum total of the 
socio-cultural effects of the growth and difusion of applicable knowledge. This 
view is explicitly stated in some seminal works on modernization theory and in-
plicitly presupposed in others. The most obviously relevant applications of 
knowledge have to do with the most visibly effective instruments of power; de-
rivative strategies of modernization - i. e. those constructed in response to and in 
defence against pioneering projects - are therefore likely to begin with military, 
administrative and industrial innovations. But the ramifications of strategic learn-
ing extend to all areas of social life. 
     It is hardly necessary to underline the particular relevance of this concep-
tion to the Japanese case. Japanese modernization - including its self-critical 
accompaniments - is to an unusually high degree centred on strategic learning 
processes. This orientation was already characteristic of the emerging Meiji state, 
committd to "seeking knowledge throughout the world" for self-strengthening 
purposes. A more thoroughgoing version of the same strategy was advocated by 
those who wanted to push the appropriation of Western knowledge beyond the 
limits of power-centred pragmatism; the notion of bunmei kaika (civilization and 
enlightenment) served to define the goal of uncompromising modernization. 
Learning from Western experience in order to contest Western ascendancy was 
no less central to later phases of Japan's transformation; it seems clear that the 
capitalist developmental state matured on the basis of lessons drawn from the in-
terwar breakdown of Western capitalism as well as from the totalitarian responses 
to it. At the same time, the critical idea of uncompleted enlightenment crystal-
                             163
Johann P. ARNASON 
lized into a more explicitly negative diagnosis of the dominant trend. This is a 
key theme in Maruyama Masao's seminal essay on "thought in Japan": modern 
Japan may have excelled in borrowing ideas and techniques from the West, but it 
has yet to assimilate a more structured and cumulative model of the growth of 
knowledge.11 Last but not least, the role of Marxism in modern Japanese thought 
and culture should be seen in this light. If Japanese Marxism was both the most 
original offshoot of the Marxist tradition outside Europe and the most repre-
sentative oppositional ideology inside Japan (the latter fact has perhaps been more 
widely understood than the former), both aspects are obviously related to its 
claim to represent a systematic and definitive self-knowledge of modernity. 
      In short, this first interpretive model - let us call it the cognitivist con-
ception of modernization - is eminently applicable to the Japanese experience. If 
we want to determine its limits in that regard, a brief glance at basic conceptual 
problems may be useful. The first point to note is that the idea of modernity 
which we have been discussing is by no means incapable of further development 
and differentiation. In particular, it can be argued that it contains in nuce a no-
tion of reflexive modernization, and that the latter concept is therefore neither as 
new nor as challenging as some contemporary authors have argued. If the overall 
modernizing process is analyzed as a dynamic configuration of intended and un-
intended effects of cognitive progress, it seems logical to assume that there will 
be historical conjunctures characterized by attempts to update the cognitive prog-
ram of modernity in response to cumulative dynamics of unintended consequ-
ences (both aspects, the confrontation with endogenous but unexpected problems 
and the articulation of significantly altered but still modern projects, have been 
stressed by theorists of reflexive modernization). In that sense, the concept is 
clearly applicable to nineteenth-century Western states and societies: new ideolo-
gies of modernity took shape against the background of conflict-laden and disin-
tegrative modernizing processes. And the same thing is doubly true for Japan. 
The strategies of modernization after 1868 were based on observation of the trou-
bles encountered by Western models and anticipation of the specific problems 
likely to be caused by the transfer of the latter to the Japanese context. It can 
thus be argued that Japanese modernization entered its reflexive phase in 1868. 
Needless to say, no value judgment is implied. The concept, as used here, does 
not have the connotations of a higher, more complete or more liberating type of 
modernization. 
     There is, furthemore, no unbridgeable gap between the claims of the cog-
nitivist conception and the language of systems theory. A suitably diversified
11 Cf. M. Maruyama, Denken in Japan, Frankfurt / M, 1988. 
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notion of cognitive growth can be translated into systemic models. The well-
known Parsonian model can be read in this way: here we cannot go into detail, 
but it may be suggested that the idea of adaptive upgrading (the main criterion of 
evolutionary progress) applies not only to the economic dimension, but also to 
other subsystems, inasmuch as their structures and functions are adapted to the 
rules and tasks inherent in the overall systemic pattern. The organizational codes 
of mutually complementary subsystems are, in a sense, objectified and program-
ming patterns of knowledge whose application leads to improved performance. 
Systemic logic shapes the course of social change and evolution in a way fun-
damentally analogous to the effects of cognitive progress. It is in keeping with 
this background affinity that Parsons' account of Japanese modernization arrives 
at much the same conclusions as those who work with more straightforward 
cognitivist models: the Japanese record of learning from the West (the latter being 
taken to represent the "main pattern" of modernity) is unequalled, but the results 
so far are notably one-sided, and a comparable effort will be needed to create a 
balanced modern society. 12 Whether later developments in systems theory (espe-
cially the work of Niklas Luhmann) have led to a more radical break with the 
ideas discussed above is - for present purposes - an open question, and in any 
case, the absence of any significant references to Japan makes them less relevant 
to our theme. 
     I have referred to the core premise of the first comparative approach as an 
image or interpretation of modernity; but it is a self-relativizing image in the 
sense that modernization - qua cognitive progress of a more or less linear kind 
- becomes primary, and modernity can only be defined as a condition which 
gives free rein or minimizes obstacles to the modernizing process. By the same 
token, this frame of reference excludes the notion of multiple modernities. There 
is nothing in the cognitivist conception that would allow us to talk about signifi-
cantly different durable configurations of modernity. That idea only makes sense 
if we can distinguish several components of the modern constellation, as well as 
different ways of relating them to each other, with more or less significant effects 
on their internal logics and constitutions. And such assumptions can, in turn, 
only be sustained if differences due to historical contexts are integrated into the 
paradigm: the historicity of modernity is irreducible to general models and 
theories. Multiple modernities are, by definition, historically conditioned, shaped 
and circumscribed modernities. 
     As I will try to show, this pluralistic conception of modernity can be link-
ed to the second of our comparative perspectives. The connection is less straight-
12 T. Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, Englewood Cliffs, 1971, pp. 134-7. 
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forward than the first one, but the distinctive features noted by historians may 
point to theoretical issues familiar from other contexts. More specifically, the de-
velopments associated with state-building after 1868 add up to a comprehensive 
pattern of institutional and ideological formation which sets Japan apart from 
other societies in a similarly advanced phase of modernization. As S.N. Eisen-
stadt stresses in his recent work on Japanese civilization, the analysis of Japanese 
modernity should begin with the construction of the Meiji state, its relationship 
to the various social actors and arenas of the modernizing process, and the ten-
sions subsequently generated by the very success of the interventionist "school-
master state."" For our purpose, it seems convenient to begin with the relation-
ship between state and economy. If it is analyzed in terms of a gradual but not 
linear growth of the developmental state (including phases of experimentation, 
retreat and malfunctioning), it raises important questions about boundaries and 
interconnections between social spheres. The institutions of capitalism and the 
bureaucratic state are mutually integrated in a peculiar way, and this arrangement 
is not simply superimposed on a standard pattern of differentiation; rather, the 
interconnections affect the internal constitution of each side in fundamental ways. 
The obvious originality of Japanese practices in this area has led some observers 
to question the very validity of Western-style concepts of state and capitalism; 
but as indicated above, the most promising line of interpretation - exemplified 
by the work of Chalmers Johnson - presents Japanese economic development as 
a reinvention of capitalism, actively assisted and oriented by the bureaucratic 
state. 
     A broader overview of the relationship between state and society throws 
further light on the pattern of integration or differentiation. Here we can draw 
on arguments developd by Murakami Yasusuke, without necessarily accepting 
their entire theoretical framework.14 A closer look at the Japanese case helps to 
establish the nation-state as the main modern agency of integration (and as the 
historical reality behind the idealizing constructs of mainstream Western sociolo-
gy); the main reason why Japanese experience can thus serve as a basic corrective 
to Western theory is that it constitutes an exceptionally clear-cut case of a nation-
state extending its scope of activity without taking the trans-national ideological 
turn which has been typical of other ambitious state-centred projects. As Eisen-
stadt has emphasized, the Meiji state pursued the twin goals of control and mobi-
lization in a way comparable to Western regimes of revolutionary origin, and this 
remains true of its successors. At the same time, this twofold strategy of en-
13 Cf. S. N. Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View, Chicago, 1996, pp.23-49. 
14 Cf. Murakami Yasusuke, "Modernization in terms of integration: The case of Japan", in S. N. Eisen-
   stadt (ed.), Patterns of Modernity, vol.2: Beyond the West, London, 1987 pp.65-88.
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hanced integration was combined with an imported model of modern society 
which reflected Western standards and visions of differentiation. In the course of 
the modernizing process, these two aspects interacted in complex and changing 
ways, including strategic adjustment on both sides (e. g. the retreat from early 
Meiji ideas of the unity of state and religion as well as a comprehensive state con-
trol over the economy) and attempts to upgrade the integrative framework, so as 
to make it more resistant to the side-effects of its own success. And it seems a 
plausible claim that growing tensions between them played a key role in the in-
complete (and soon to be reversed) changes which set Taisho Japan apart from 
the much longer and more formative Meiji period. 
      The discussion of integrative and differentiating factors, central to any 
analysis of modernity, would be inconclusive without some comments on the 
cultural dimension, i. e. the self-interpretation and self-affirmation of differenti-
ated spheres as well as the interpretive and legitimizing aspects of the integrative 
forces. In this context, the distinctively Japanese relationship between state and 
nation is of particular importance. It is generally agreed that the modern Japanese 
construction of national identity and the ideological projects built on that basis 
differed from European counterparts in significant ways. Maruyama Masao's 
seminal analysis of Japanese nationalism contains insights which have yet to be 
fully assimilated by Western theorists, but his specific accents and his choice of 
the term "ultra-nationalism" reflect a somewhat one-sided - albeit understand-
able - concern with the militarist phase that had come to an end in 1945. A 
more balanced approach would have to do justice to the exceptional totalizing 
capacity as well as the adaptability of Japanese nationalism; it should also account 
for both affinities and diffierences between modern nationalism and traditional 
Japanese patterns of collective identity. As for the latter, S.N. Eisenstadt and B. 
Giesen have proposed the term "principled primordiality. "15 More specifically, a 
model of order borrowed from a more advanced civilization (China) was used to 
consolidate and transfigure an ethnic particularism which thus became more resis-
tant to universalist alternatives. The transition to modern nationalism, triggered 
by the threat from Western nation-states, was a complex process which opened 
up various and in part contrasting possibilities." During the Meiji period, a 
high-powered conception of national identity and integration took shape and was 
imposed against other currents; its continuing dominance was to some extent 
obscured by the more visible liberalizing trends of the Taisho interlude, but the 
subsequent militarist turn brought nationalism back to prominence and led critical 
15 Cf. S. N. Eisenstadt and B.Giesen, "The construction of collective identity", Archives Europeennes de 
   Sociologic 36 (1995), pp. 72-102. 
16 Cf. C. Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, Princeton, 1985. 
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observers to conflate the underlying pattern with its most extreme manifesta-
tions. A comprehensive interpretive history of modern Japanese nationalism -
which no Western scholar has so far attempted to write - would need to 
account for reorientations before and after militarist rule without losing sight of 
long-term constants. 
     In the present context, it is the integrative logic of nationalism and its in-
teraction with the modernizing dynamic of differentiation that should be under-
lined; let us note a few points which fit the emerging picture of a distinctive pat-
tern of modernity. First, the strong and sweeping claims on behalf of the nation-
al collectivity made it more difficult for universalist ideologies (liberal or socialist, 
secular as well as religious) to articulate and impose their principles; Western 
forms of ideological differentiation could thus only develop to a limited extent. 
Second, the systematic reference to the national collective as a legitimizing and 
mobilizing authority set limits to the self-articulation of social spheres and forces, 
with the result that Japanese patteerns of institutional formation and social strati-
fication differ substantially from the Western ones; neither functional nor norma-
tive rationalizations of claims to autonomy could play the same role (S.N. Eisen-
stadt has developed this analysis in much greater detail). Finally, the imaginary 
paradigm of the national community served not only to reinforce core political 
institutions, but at the same time to devalue or de-legitimize the more mundane 
and divisive aspects of political life. A major counterweight to the unfolding dif-
ferentiation of the political sphere was thus built into Japanese political culture. 
And it could function in two complementary ways: On the one hand, ethnic 
nationalism became an expression of protest against the authoritarian practices of 
the modernizing bureaucratic state, and of the wish for a more harmonious re-
lationship between state and society.17 On the other hand, the vision of national 
unity beyond political division and conflict lent effective support to strategies of 
totalitarian integration. It is probably true that Western scholars have tended to 
underestimate the first aspect; but it is also true that the anti-statist version of 
nationalism was to a very significant degree absorbed or neutralized by official 
ultra-nationalism. 
      These considerations should suffice to show that the Japanese case cannot 
be subsumed under a uniform pattern of advanced modernity. It remains to clar-
ify the implications of the third perspective for the problematic of plural moder-
nity. As noted above, the results of recent work on the regional background are 
less conclusive than those of better-established approaches; but it can at least be 
said that the question of the East Asian civilizational legacy and its formatve
17 Cf. K. Doak, "Ethnic nationalism in Japan", journal ofJapanese Studies, 1996.
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impact on modern history has been put on the agenda, even if we have at the 
same time become more conscious of the pitfalls and short-circuits to be avoided 
when tackling this theme. On a more general theoretical level, it is the problem 
of civilizational frameworks of modernity - or, in cautious terms, the role of 
civilizational factors in the diversification of modernity - that we have to con-
front. This is not the place for detailed conceptual analysis; suffice it to say that 
we are using the concept of civilization in a sense outlined most convincingly by 
Durkheim and Mauss. In their language, the term refers to large-scale and long-
term units of social analysis; civilizations transcend societies both in space and 
time. Although the comparative study of civilizational complexes must begin 
with different clusters of cultural features (capable of diffusion and more or less 
open to modification within a civilizational area), the arguments adumbrated by 
Durkheim and Mauss also suggests that cultural definitions of power (reflected in 
political structures) are of particular importance. In brief, interrelated patterns of 
culture and power can be seen as the core constituents of civilizational identity, 
and the following remarks should be read in that sense. 
     Before going on the consider the relevance of civilizational theory to the 
analysis of Japanese modernity, it seems advisable to note some basic caveats and 
qualifications that follow from the above discussion - especially with regard to 
the problematic of the East Asian region, but also in the light of more general 
points made about conceptions of modernity. To begin with a very elementary 
observation: as the difficulties of the Confucian model show, civilizational 
frameworks should not be identified with orthodox, representative or prog-
rammatic ideologies. Clusters of collective representations (or imaginary signi-
fications, to use the more specific concept proposed by Castoriadis) are by defini-
tion central to civilizational analysis, but their capacity to crystallize into ideolo-
gies and claim the status of orthodoxy should be treated as a variable, dependent 
on intrinsic as well as contextual factors. Comparative studies have shown that 
some civilizational patterns are more conducive to the formation of orthodoxy 
than others, and some orthodoxies are more exclusive than others (or more cap-
able of containing dissent and heterodoxy). Within one civilizational complex, 
some societies may differ from others in both degree and kind, as regards the 
construction of orthodoxy; here the contrasts between China, Korea and Japan 
seem particularly interesting. Another lesson to be learnt from the East Asian 
case concerns the question of inbuilt transformative capacity (or predisposition to 
social change). This should also be treated as a key variable, and civilizational 
patterns can differ not only in respect of their ability to develop it, but also in the 
sense that the potential for change may be more or less dependent on activation 
by external factors. Historical research has disposed of the idea that East Asian 
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societies stagnated before the nineteenth-century encounter with the expanding 
West, but it still seems possible to speak of particularly effective structures and 
strategies of containment. As for the changes that did take place in the aftermath 
of Western intrusion, the East Asian record of radical change is surely unsurpas-
sed by any other region. This is most obviously true about Japan; as for China, 
the story of its protracted revolutionary crisis is a familiar one, but some doubts 
remain about its meaning. A prominent authority on the subject has argued that 
the Chinese experience reflects an underlying resistance to radical change: it took 
a whole series of upheavals and convulsions to make Chinese society ripe for 
revolution." But if we consider the whole trajectory since the mid-nineteenth 
century and the variety of successive or competing projects (from the Taiping 
rebellion to the rival twentieth-century strategies of imperial reconstruction), a 
rather different diagnosis seems to suggest itself: the long-drawn-out collapse of 
the old order released a broad spectrum of forces aspiring to radical change. And 
in a very different setting, the rapid transformations - in incompatible directions 
- that have taken place in independent but divided Korea point to similar con-
clusions. 
     The problem of social change and its civilizational preconditions is closely 
related to another issue: the varying openness to and ability to cope with inter-
civilizational encounters. The latter term, coined by Benjamin Nelson, refers to 
episodes of particularly formative - very often one-sided - interaction between 
civilizations. This is one of the more important but less developed themes of 
civilizational theory; a persistent tendency to over-emphasize civilizational closure 
has led some of the most prominent authors in the field to neglect the other side 
of the picture. Here we must limit ourselves to a few observations regarding 
East Asia and the particular position of Japan within the regional context. The 
first thing to be noted is a long early phase of relative isolation: the formation of 
the East Asian civilizational complex, centred on China, was a more self-con-
tained process than other comparable developments in the Eurasian world. In the 
later history of the region, phases of heightened receptivity alternate with inward 
turns and active isolationism. East Asia became the most important outlet for the 
expansion of the only non-monotheistic universal religion (Buddhism). But dur-
ing the epoch of global Western expansion, East Asian states had reverted to 
cultural closure and political detachment; this is all the more striking in view of 
the material and cultural resources that could in principle have sustained a more 
activist strategy. As for later changes in the wake of direct encounters with a 
more powerful West, the vigour and originality of East Asian responses stand out 
18 Vandermeersch, Le nouveau monde sinise, Paris, 1986, pp. 152-3. 
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in contrast to other regions. No East Asian state was colonized by the West (the 
idea of China having been reduced to quasi-colonial status is very misleading), 
but Western models were appropriated in a selective fashion and applied in a dis-
tinctive context (most strikingly in Japan and China, but the same can - mutatis 
mutandis - be said about the devlopment of the two Koreas within the bipolar 
system dominated by Western rivals for hegemony). Twentieth-century East 
Asian history is noteworthy for the wide range of Western political projects -
liberal democracy, socialism, communism, nationalism and fascism - that have 
been imported and /or reinvented, and sometimes radicalized beyond the original 
versions. Some observers might question the inclusion of liberal democracy in 
this list. But the postwar Japanese experience is surely a significant case, and the 
recurrent questions about the reality or authenticity of Japanese democracy are 
misleading; the point is, rather, that the institutions of liberal democracy have 
been adopted with important modifications, and the restrictive aspects of the lat-
ter do not add up to a systematic perversion. 
     In a sense, the Japanese trajectory exemplifies the regional pattern on a 
smaller scale but in a more intensive fashion. The history of Japan's relationship 
with continental East Asia (and thus also with the imported traditions that had 
become an integral part of the East Asian world) is reminiscent of the interplay 
of closure and opening which marked the interaction of the whole civilizational 
complex with the outside world. But in the Japanese case, the appropriation of 
the Chinese model led to an irreversible reconstitution and self-redefinition which 
Buddhism never achieved in China. Similarly, Japan can be seen as the most ex-
treme case of the regional response to the West: the Westernizing process (self-
controlled with the exception of the postwar American occupation) was more 
far-reaching and many-sided than elsewhere, and it could be interpreted as a de-
finitive divorce from the Asian world; this self-image never prevailed over 
others, but it remained a part of ongoing debates.
                      III 
     With the above qualifications in mind, we should now turn to a more 
systematic discussion of civilization and modernity in the Japanese context. If the 
general idea of civilizational premises of Japanese modernity is accepted, there are 
three different ways of developing it further. The main focus can be on a shared 
East Asian background; on constitutive characteristics of Japan as a civilization in 
its own right; or on the civilizational duality inherent in the Japanese way of 
being involved in the East Asian civilizational complex without wholly belonging 
to it. These approaches are more or less clearly represented in recent literature on 
                              171
Johann P. ARNASON 
the subject.
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